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NRO & USAF REVIEWS COMPLETED

18 AUG 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NRO Trends

1. TRENDS:

a. The most revealing document regarding the AF/DOD concept of the NRO roles of CIA and the Air Force is the earliest draft version of a proposed agreement paper (prepared by Colonel Martin and concurred in by Dr. Charyk) which went into considerable detail. The role advocated for the CIA was one largely of support, i.e., security and contracting.

b. The NRO implementation trend since the CIA/DOD signing of the basic NRO agreement has been in the direction of a support role for CIA in emerging new programs with the following exceptions or partial exceptions:

(1) TAGBOARD: CIA was given this program initially. Later, Dr. Charyk, as DNRO, established a Program D Director (AF - Colonel Geary) and gradually changed his position to one of transferring TAGBOARD to the Program D Director. This view is held by the present DNRO.

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(2) Advanced Aircraft Studies: Funding requested for this purpose by CIA in FY 1964, i.e., [Redacted] was not contested by NRO.

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c. The NRO implementation trend and impact on CIA efforts relating to old and new programs other than those mentioned above:


(1) Satellite Programs:

(a) CORONA/MURAL:

Initially and until NRO emergence, CIA had a technical management role in the CORONA/MURAL program except as noted below. About a year prior to NRO emergence, Dr. Charyk, as Undersecretary of the Air Force, took over responsibility for CORONA funding and scheduling. Prior to this time, Colonel Battle at SSD operated as an executive agent for this Agency in handling day-to-day affairs relating to payload areas and in dealing with payload contractors. CIA, as technical manager dealt directly together with SSD in contacts with contractors. However, with the Dr. Charyk edict noted above, and later with the emergence of the NRO, the CIA role was diluted. CIA found itself largely participating in contracting, security, communications and CCB matters only. With the emergence of NRO and transfer of the Operations Control Center to NRO and the foregoing, SSD contacts with CIA technical people practically ceased, except in CCB matters. Contractors, also avoided technical contacts with CIA people except on CCB or NPIC matters. The contractor contact was with SSD and through SSD to NRO, with CIA informed of actions but not as an active participant as in the past. The most recent example of this in a significant technical area concerns the MURAL Improvement investigations. Initially an NRO TWX to SSD and CIA called for a coordinated approach, but later was amended to place Program A Director in charge, as an executive agent. This resulted in CIA having no voice in the deliberations and eventual recommendations to be submitted to the DNRO. At CIA request, a briefing was given CIA on the same day that the briefing was given the DNRO, with the Director, Program A, and Director, Program B,

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

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present. Essentially the recommendations submitted by Director, Program A, were "frozen in concrete" and in no way constituted the results of a joint CIA/AF working level collaboration.

(b) ARGON:

The ARGON technical management initially followed the CORONA pattern. The recent ARGON follow-on program approved by the DNRO has been assigned to the Program A Director for technical management purposes. CIA's role, formerly a technical one, now is a support one, i.e., contracts and security and CCB membership.

(c) LANYARD:

The LANYARD technical management was assigned initially and remains a Program A Director responsibility. This program ~~which~~ utilizes  hardware in part. The Program A Director had technical management for 

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The CIA role in this program is security, contracting and CCB membership.

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The Program A Director has primary technical responsibility for this effort.

(2) Aircraft Systems:

(a) OXCART:

CIA has technical management, operations, contracting and security responsibilities. The Air Force has a logistics and support role. This management relationship has been agreed upon in writing by the CIA and Air Force.

(b) IDEALIST Program:

CIA has technical management, operations, contracting and security responsibilities. The Air Force has a logistics and support role. This management relationship has been agreed upon in writing by the CIA and the Air Force.

(c) TAGBOARD: See l.b.(1) above.

(d) [REDACTED] KEDLOCK and R-12 and SAC U-2 Programs:

The Air Force (Colonel Geary and Program D Director) has technical management responsibility for these programs. CIA's role is a support one, i.e., contracting and security.

(e) Possible Areas of Contention in Aircraft Areas:

(1) Role of JRC or NRO in Operations, both OXCART and IDEALIST.

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(3) Eastman-Kodak Processing, Research and Development,
and Film and Equipment Procurement:

In the past CIA had technical direction, contracting, security and general management responsibility for IDEALIST, OXCART, CORONA, LANYARD, ARGON and R&D matters at Eastman Kodak. SSD had a separate contract with Eastman-Kodak for facility for

When the NRO was established, the NRO directed that CIA have contracting and security responsibility for all programs. The Director Program A was given responsibility for R and D matters, with CIA participating as a member of the CCB. (Basic research should be stressed at Eastman. The present program appears to be too operationally oriented.) The NRO staff has taken over responsibility for establishing film procurement requirements at Eastman-Kodak and processing requirements for all programs. The CIA role at present at Eastman-Kodak is a support one though over the years CIA not only set-up the processing facility at Eastman but managed it since 1956.

2. Since the emergence of the NRO and authority granted the DNRO to assign responsibilities relating to the National Reconnaissance Program, CIA's role in the reconnaissance technical effort appears to emerge as a support effort with the exception of programs clearly assigned to CIA, such as OXCART and IDEALIST.

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